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Defining the."Task at Hand":
Non-Science Forensic Science After
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
D. Michael Risinger*
. The Lessons of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
The 1970s and early 1980s were aperiod ofvirtuallyunbridled expansion
of asserted expertise in civil and criminal courtrooms, limited only by theimagination of an attorney with apointto prove and a hole in her more conven-
tional evidence.' The appeal of using such experts stemmed in large part from
two aspects of the law, one in regard to experts and one in regard to sufficiency
of evidence. Courts allowed experts to phrase opiniontestimonyinterms ofthe
ultimate issues in the case.2 If the "opinion" of the expert was competent, the
jury might adoptthe opinion in toto, making failure of proof on the issue legally
impossible. Combine this situation with decidedly lax threshold standards of
admissibility for expertise, and the stage was set for the acceptance of some
fairly questionable practices in the utilization of expertise by litigants. Conse-
quently, although all sides were free to play the game, the result was generally
much more favorable to parties with the proof burdens (generally civil plain-
tiffs and the prosecution in criminal cases, though criminal defendants were
substantial players in regard to various affinmative defenses).
Inthe mid and late 1980s, critics raised their voices in protest, saying that
the kind of expertise the courts regularly accepted as admissible was franiky
'"unk" of scandalous lack of dependability. Voices protested the lack of
reliability in both criminal and civil spheres,3 but the voice that finally spoke
* B.A, Yale, 1966, JSD., Harvard, 1969; Professor of Law, Seton Hall University
School of Law. The author would like to thank Michael J. Saks and Mark P. Denbeaux for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. See Richard H. Underwood, "X-purt" Witnesses, 19 An. J. TRIALADVOC. 343,345-
48 (1995) (discussing increasing role of expert testimony).
2. See FED. R. EVID. 704(a) (stating that "testimony ... is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact").
3. See D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification 'Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731,
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loudest and was heard most clearly, spoke almost exclusively of the injustice
of junk expertise used against civil defendants. I refer, of course, to Peter
Huber and his 1991 book, Galileo 's Revenge,4 which popularized the phrase
"junk science." Given the polemical success of that book, it seems unlikely
to have been pure coincidence that the United States Supreme Court chose a
civil case to review the appropriate threshold criteria of reliability for expert
testimony, or that its two subsequent forays into these waters have also been
in civil cases. Be that as it may, the pronouncements of the Supreme Court
are given as trans-substantive constructions of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and so have application in criminal as well as civil cases.
The wellspring case, as everyone knows, is Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' Like many groundbreaking decisions, Daubert was
neither fully worked out nor fully coherent. The day after the Court decided
Daubert, the Washington Post characterized it as a victory for those who
wanted expertise more easily admitted, while the New York Times character-
ized it as a victory for those who wanted more expertise rejected.6 This
schizoid characterization ofthe case has continued in both academic commen-
tary and lines of judicial decision down to the present time. In a recent
opinion, Judge Gertner of the Massachusetts U.S. District Court attributes this
to what she calls "competing vectors" in the Daubert opinion.' The first
779 (1989) (claiming that "the law does not yet know how to deal with science, or with things
asserting themselves to be science").
4. PETERW.HUBER, ALILEO'S REVENGE (1991).
5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. Compare Joan Biscupie, Judges Get Broader Discretion in AllowingScienifc Testi-
mony, WASH. POST, June 29, 1993, at A6 (stating that Supreme Court relaxed standards for
admission of scientific testimony in Daubert), with Linda Greenhouse, Justices Put Judges in
Charge of Deciding Reliabiliy of Scientific Testimony, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1993, at A13
("The 7-2 decision invited judges to be aggressive in screening out ill founded or speculative
scientific theories.").
7. Compare David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door,
Please: Exploring the Pas4 Understanding the Present and Worrying About the Future of
ScientificEvidence, 15 CARDOZOL.REV 1799,1801-02 (1994) (arguing thatDaubertgenerally
raises bar on admissibility) with Arvin Maskin, The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Scientfic Evidence: The Supreme Court Catches Up With a Decade of Jurisprudence, 15
CARnOzO L. REv. 1929, 1942 (1994) (claiming that Daubert should be viewed as making
admission easier). See also 1 DAVID L. FAIGMANET AL., MODERN SCINTiFicEvIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OFEXPETRT TESTIMONY § 1-3.3, at 17-28 (2000 Supp.) (comparing Daubert
test to Frye test). Faigman et al. make the most persuasive analysis. They argue that Daubert
is more limiting than the Frye general acceptance test when the Frye test would let in expertise
generally accepted by a "community" on shaky grounds, but less limiting than Frye when
something too new to be said to have gained "general acceptance" can nevertheless be shown
to be extremely reliable. Id.
8. See United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 65-67 (D. Mass. 1999) (analyzing
competing interpretations of Daubert).
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vector, which points towards a more rigorous standard of reliability, is charac-
terized by the Court's emphasis on scientific standards and its encouragement
of gatekeeping review under Rule 702 ofthe Federal Rules of Evidence.' The
second vector, which points in the opposite direction, is characterized by the
uniqueness of the trial setting, the "assist the trier" standard,' ° and flexibility
(coupled with its rejection of "general acceptance" as an absolute sine qua non
of admissibility for scientific expertise)."
Even as it became reasonably clear that the effect of the Daubert decision
in regard to scientific testimony was to raise the bar for admission,'2 two
general schools of thought about the "true meaning of Daubert" in regard to
"non-scientific" expertise emerged. The first school saw Daubert as essen-
tially a general construction of Rule 702 and the judge's systemic gatekeeping
duties in regard to the sufficient reliability of all proffered expert testimony.
To members of this school, Daubert's particular expositions about scientific
evidence were important as guides to the kind of reliability that ought to be
required of all expertise, even if the so-called "Daubert factors" (which the
Daubert opinion itself said were neither sine qua nons themselves, nor ex-
haustive) applied most powerfully to the products of the conventional sci-
ences. People of this persuasion have, under the banner of Daubert, tended
to call upon courts to examine proffered claims of expertise specifically and
critically and have tended to advocate for generally rigorous standards of
reliability as a condition of admissibility.
The other main school of-thought believed that Daubert ought to be read
as limited to scientific expertise, narrowly confined to the experimental
sciences. As to all other forms of expertise, especially expertise with a
claimed "experiential" or "clinical" component, this school of thought under-
stood Daubert's broader references to Rule 702 as no more than restating the
pre-existing understanding of the duty of the court under the "helpfulness"
standard, without suggesting that-this standard ought-to be tightened up regard-
ing reliability. Thus, as to non-scientific evidence, the second school of
thought regarded practice under Rule 702 as unaffected and unchanged. To
the extent some explicit approach to reliability was thought necessary for such
testimony, people of this persuasion have tended to favor a more general or
9. Id.
10. This standard is named after its emphasis on the language in Rule 702 that expert
testimony need only "assist the trier of fact" to be admissible.
11. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d. at 66-67.
12. In a recent article, I examine more than 2000 cases that have cited Daubert from its
decision until August 2000. This study reveals that most reported Daubert challenges have
been in civil cases, most have been made against civil plaintiffis by defendants, and most have
been successful. See generally D. Michael Risinger, NavigatingExpertReliability: Are Crim-
inal Standards of CertaintyBeingLeft on the Dock?, 64 AIB. L. REV. 99 (2000).
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global examination of the claimed abilities of practitioners of the asserted
expertise. They have advocated, at least where applicable, some version of
either a "sufficient experience" test" (relying on the expert's previous more or
less similar experience, without further proof that the experience has resulted
in any reliable skill), or a "guild" test, 4 in which the existence of an organized
13. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert. Developing a Similarly
EpistemologicalApproach toEnsuringtheReliabii vofNon-Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO
L. Rgv 2271, 2292-94 (1994) (laying out "sufficient experience" approach); see also Lisa M.
Agrimonte, The Limitations ofDaubert and Its Application to Quasi-Scienfic Experts, A Two
Year Case Review of Daubert v. Merrdll Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 113 S. Ct 2787 (1993),
35 WASHBURN L.. 134, 152-56 (1995) (setting forth new two-factor test for admissibility of
quasi-scientific expert testimony); L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the
Future, 29 U. RICIL L. REV. 1389, 1457-62 (1995) (arguing for new test for reliability require-
ment).
To be fair to Professor Imwinkelried, the test was set out as a preliminary step in an article
pointing out the difficulties of formulating reliability tests for non-scientific expertise, especially
"clinical" or "experience-based" expertise. Professor Imwinkelried himself well understood that
Daubert's general aspects required gatekeeping vigilance as to all expertise. Unfortunately, the
approach he set out was easily embraced by proponents of the pre-Daubert status quo because
all that it required was the testimony of the witness that he had had lots of experience, and that
much of it was in circumstances substantially like those in the case at hand. See generally, e.g.,
testimony of Grant R. Sperry, infra note 107. Practitioners of all sorts of questionable claimed
skills can pass this test. It is not that the test is not sufficient for some kinds of expertise in
some circumstances. It works fine for what I have called "everyday summarizational" experts,
who testify to such things as industry practice from their years in an industry. See D. Michael
Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise, in 3 MODERN SCIEN-
TIFIC EvmENcE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 34-2.1, at 4-7 (David L.
Faigman et al. eds., 1999) (discussing summarizational experts). The problem is that it supplies
little in the way of validation for what I have called "translational" experts, such as handwriting
identification experts, who claim that they can translate their experience into particular
adjudicative inferences. Id. at 8-14. Here, we must worry about the reliability of not only the
subjective data base, but also the subjective translational system applied to it. In short, merely
showing up at the scene after auto accidents, even hundreds of times, is a weak warrant to
believe a witness's inferences about what happened in the accident itself.
14. The "guild" test goes beyond the "sufficient experience" test by focusing inquiry on
the existence of a group that certifies training, experience, and methodology. Acceptance by
such a group establishes reliability. Note that this is not the Frye test applied to non-scientific
expertise because in the absence of such group acceptance an individual witness might be found
reliable for other reasons. Like the Frye test, however, acceptance by such a group guarantees
admissibility. The problem, of course, is that astrology can pass this test. For the most
extended and explicit assertion of the guild approach, see Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting
Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251, 291-93 (1998)
(arguing that guild approach is preferable test). See also Agrimonte, supra note 13, at 155
(arguing for now two-factor test); Daniel 1. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699,
741-46 (1998) (analyzing cases applying guild test); J. Brook Lathram, The "Same Intellectual
Rigor" Test Provides an Effective Method for Determining the Reliability ofAll Expert Testi-
mony, WithoutRegard to Whether the Testimony Comprises "Scientific Knowledge" or '"Tech-
nical or Other Specialized Knowledge, "28 U. MEM L. REV. 1053, 1063-68 (1998) (arguing
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group which supervises accreditation (and an expert's membership in it) is
taken as a sufficient warrant to infer reliability for admissibility purposes. In
the courts, these usually conflated approaches"5 have been especiallyprevalent
in regard to the products of"forensic science" in criminal cases. Unfortunately
for their adherents, the Supreme Court's decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Car-
michael 6 has pretty much destroyed the tenability of these approaches."
I could not write a more elegant or efficient summary of circumstances
involved in the Kumho Tire case than that of the Reporter of Decisions in the
Syllabus:
When a tire on the vehicle driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out and the
vehicle overturned, one passenger died and the others were injured. The
survivors and the decedent's representative, respondents here, broughtthis
diversity suit againstthetire's makerand its distrbutor (collectivelyKumho
Tire), claimingthatthetirethatfailedwas defective. Theyrestedtheir case
in significant part upon the depositions of a tire failure analyst, Dennis
Carlson, Jr., who intended to testify that, in his expert opinion, a defect in
the tire's manufacture or design caused the blow out. That opinion was
based upon a visual and tactile inspection of the tire and upon the theory
that in the absence of at least two of four specific, physical symptoms
indicating tire abuse, the tire failure of the sort that occurred here was
caused by a defect. Kumho Tire moved to exclude Carlson's testimony on
the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence
702, which says: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact. . . ,a witness qualified as an expert... may
testifythereto inthe form of an opinion." Granting the motion (and enter-
ing summary judgment for the defendants), the District Court acknowl-
edged that it should act as a reliability "gatekeeper" under Daubert v.
MerrellDowPharmaceuticals, Inc., inwhichthis CourtheldthatRule 702
imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that scientific
testimony is not only relevant, but reliable. The court noted that Daubert
discussed four factors - testing, peer review, error rates, and "acceptabil-
ity" in the relevant scientific community - which might prove helpful in
for application of same test to scientific or technical expert testimony); Peter B. Oh, Assessing
Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 64 DEF.
COUNS. J. 556, 565-67 (1997) (explicitly advocating Frye test for non-scientific evidence);
Thomas M. Reavley & Daniel A. PetalasA PleaforReturn to Evidence Rule 702,77 TEX. L.
REv. 493, 511-13 (1998) (discussing need for clear objective test). The practical (though often
inexplicit) adoption of the guild test by courts is discussed infra at Section I.
15. In the opinions, one often has to infer the test implicitly being used, usually from the
Court's recitation of training, experience, and guild membership, followed by a conclusory
declaration of reliability. See infra Section H (applying lessons of Kumho Tire). When the two
tests are hopelessly conflated, I often refer to the mixed product simply as the guild test
16. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
17. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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determining the reliability of aparticularscientifitheyortechnique...
and found that those factors argued against the reliability of Carlson's
methodology. On the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the court
agreed that Daubert should be applied flexibly, that its four factors were
simply illustrative, and that other factors could argue in favor of admissi-
bility. However, the court affirmed its earlier order because it found insuf-
ficient indications of the reliability of Carlson's methodology. In revers-
ing, the Eleventh Circuit held that the District Court had erred as a matter
of law in applying Daubert. Believing that Daubert was limited to the
scientific context, the court held that the Daubert factors did not apply to
Carlson's testimony, which it characterized as skill - or experience -
based.'8
Thus, Kumho Tire squarely presented the issues of the reach of the
general Daubert approach to threshold reliability under Rule 702 and of
Daubert's application both to "non-science" and to claims of expertise that
were at least in part "clinical. 19 In the first paragraph of the opinion, Justice
Breyer discusses Daubert's general holding that:
the Federal Rules offEvidence "assignto the trial judge the task of ensuring
that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is rele-
vant to the task at hand," and its [discussion of] certain more specific
factors, such as testing, peer review, error rates and 'acceptability' in the
relevant scientific community, some or all ofwhichmight prove helpful in
detenniningthe reliability ofaparticular scientific "theory ortechnique. "20
Two sentences later, he declares "[w]e conclude that Daubert's general hold-
ing - setting forth the trial judge's general gatekeeping obligation - applies
not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony
based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge."'21 Expanding on this
point in Part II of the opinion, the Court writes that:
In Daubert, this court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a
special obligation upon a trial judge to "ensure that any and all scientific
testimony... is not only relevantbut reliable." The initial questionbefore
us is whether this basic gatekeeping obligation applies only to "scientific"
evidence or to all expert testimony. We, like the parties, believe that it
applies to all expert testimony.?
18. Id. at 137-38 (citations omitted).
19. See id. at 154 (stating that expert in Kumho Tire relied on "visual and tactile inspec-
tion" to determine "minute relative shoulder/center treadwear differences," and then determined
"that the tire before him had not been abused").
20. Id. at 141 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,597 (1993)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 147 (citations omitted).
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Later in the opinion, Justice Breyer states that "Daubert's general principles
apply to the expert matters described in Rule 702. The Rule, in respect to all
such matters, 'establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.'"2
3
Thus, post-Daubert decisions that rested on a fundamental distinction
between scientific evidence and other kinds of expertise and explicitly or by
implication applied a less rigorous standard of reliability to "non-science"
have had their main rationale removed and their results at least called into
question and put back into play. Yet when these issues are put back into play,
how is the game supposed to be played? A court must determine reliability,
but does every kind of expert evidence in every context have to meet the same
threshold level of reliability to gain admission? The Court does not address
this question. Elsewhere, I have argued that there ought to be varying levels
of foundational reliability, with that required for prosecution-proffered exper-
tise in criminal cases being very high, especially when it goes to issues of
"brute fact" guilt or innocence, such as the identity of the defendant as the
perpetrator.24
Be that as it may, what is clearly not consistent with Kumho Tire is any
attempt to approach an issue of reliability globally. That is, reliability cannot
be judged globally, "as drafted," but only specifically, "as applied." The
emphasis on the judgment of reliability as it applies to the individual case, to
the "task at hand,"' runs through the opinion like a river. Although the Court
does say early in the opinion that "the law grants a district court... broad
latitude when it decides how to determine reliability ' '26 and later says it grants
"considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about deter-mining whether particular expert testimony is reliable,"' the Court professes
that "a trial court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert
23. Id. at 149 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
24. Risinger, supra note 13, § 34-2.4, at 16.
25. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). I wish to emphasize that
the requirement of task-at-hand analysis is general and applies to all cases, even though I have
illustrated it later in the Article with regard to non-science forensic science. In the many, many
articles dealing with Kumho Tire as of this writing, the centrality of particularized task-at-hand
analysis to a proper understanding of the requirements of Kumho Tire, and of the limits of
judicial discretion under it, generally has not been recognized. In the few articles in which there
has been some recognition, it usually has been brief, buried, and unemphasized. See, for
example, Michael -. Graham, TheExpert WitnessPredicament: Determining '?eliable" Under
the Gatekeeping Test ofDaubert Kumho, and ProposedAmendment Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAML. REV. 317,339,341(2000). The most extensive treatment
appears to be in Maj. Victor Hansen, Rule of Evidence 702: The Supreme Court Provides a
Framework for Reliability Determinations, MIL. L. Rlv., Dec. 1999, at 1, 41-42, where two
paragraphs are devoted to the notion and its implications.
26. Id. at 142.
27. Id. at 152.
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where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony."28
What the Court clearly refers to is the power of the trial judge to select the
most appropriate tests of reliability for the application of expertise at issue in
the case, not a discretion to treat expertise globally rather than specifically:
"[W]hether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of
reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge
broad latitude to determine."'
In fact, in Part I of the opinion, which closely follows the first-quoted
passage above, the Court lays the foundation for the particularized approach.
The Court's analysis of what the expert was claiming to be able to conclude
in the case at hand and the reasons asserted for his claims, is a powerful
instance of teaching by example. And it seems clear that the Court intends
this lesson because the Court constructs its very particular analysis, not from
quotations drawn from the opinion of the District Court, but directly from the
record of the expert's deposition and other record documents.30 In Part I, the
Court begins the demonstration of what it wants from district courts in terms
of specificity and sophistication of analysis.
If Part I shows how to frame the particular claims of expertise at issue in
a particular case, Part III ofthe opinionillustrates howto apply various factors
to an evaluation of the reliability of those claims in the particular case.
Indeed, Part II is quite specific in its purpose. 'We further explain the way in
which a trial judge 'may' consider Daubert's factors by applying these
considerations to the case at hand."31 It is also quite specific in its rejection
of a global approach:
For one thing, and contrary to respondents' suggestion, the specific issue
before the court was not the reasonableness in general of atire expert's use
of a visual and tactile inspection to determine whether overdeflection had
caused the tire's tread to separate from its steel-belted carcass. Rather, it
was the reasonableness of using such an approach, along with Carlson's
particularmethodofanalyzingthe datatherebyobtained, to draw a conclu-
sion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony was
directly relevant .... The relevant issue was whether the expert could
reliably determine the cause of this tires separation. 2
28. Id.
29. Id at 153. As Justice Scalia points out in concurrence, failure to consider the most
relevant criteria of reliability in a given case may be an abuse of discretion. See infra note 40
and accompanying text (quoting Justice Scalia).
30. This is not lost on Justice Stevens, who dissents on the basis that the Court should not
have undertaken the particularized "well reasoned factual analysis" of Part III of the opinion.
Rather, Justice Stevens believes that the Court should have remanded to the Court of Appeals
for that purpose. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 153.
32. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
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And later:
Respondents now argue to us, as they did to the District Court, that a
method of tire failure analysis that employs a visualhactile inspection is a
reliable method, and they point both to its use by other experts and to
Carlson's long experience working for Michelin as sufficient indication
that that is so. But no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion
from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience.
Nor does anyone deny that, as a general matter, tire abuse may often be
identified by qualified experts through visual or tactile inspection of the
tire. As we said before... the questionbefore the trial court was specific,
not general Thetrial courthadto decide whetherthisparticular expert had
sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors "in deciding the par-
ticular issues in the case."
The particular issue in this case concerned the use of Carlson's two-
factor test and his related use of visual/tactile inspection to draw conclu-
sions on the basis of what seemed small observational differences.3
It seems beyond dispute that the "global" approach to establishing relia-
bility is unavailable in any case where a serious challenge to the reliability of
a particular application ofproffered expertise is raised, that is, any case where
its "factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called
sufficiently into question."3' So, it would seem that any post-Daubert case
that relied on such a global approach would once again have had the ground
upon which it stood pulled from beneath it, and its conclusions would, on that
basis, be open to question.
Finally, we come to the tenability of the "sufficient experience test" and
the "guild test" under the principles and approach of Kumho Tire. By defini-
tion, any general and exclusive adoption of such tests for all non-scientific
evidence becomes untenable once the Daubert approach is applied in princi-
ple, because both Daubert and Kumho Tire emphasized the flexible and multi-
factorial nature of any defensible evaluation of reliability. Yet both factors
may have a legitimate role to play in some kinds of expert situations. Substan-
tial experience of relevant similarity to what is at issue in the case at hand is
a necessary condition for the reliability of experience-based expertise, but in
most contexts it is not a sufficient condition to establish reliability.
Only when the expert is playing an everyday "summarizational" role is
mere experience, no matter how extensive or similar, arguably sufficient.35
When a witness is called to play a role beyond this and to make conclusions
33. Id. at 156-57 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 149.
35. A "summarizational" expert is one who is called solely to summarize the net results
of previous experience for the jury's education, such as a person with thirty years experience
in the shoe business called to testify about industry practices. See Risinger, supra note 13, § 34-
2.1, at 4-7 (defining summarizational experts).
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or inferences about adjudicative facts in the case at hand, the testimony is
based in part on experience, but in part on some translation scheme to mediate
between previous experiences and a particular conclusion in this case. In
those circumstances, reliability is dependent on both sufficient experience and
a reliable translation system"t Perhaps where there are real-world, practice-
based, empirically unambiguous indices of success or failure in coming to
one's conclusions, we might rationally rely upon experience not only to
provide the expert's data base, but also to authenticate the reliability of the
conclusory skills involved. This is perhaps the case of Judge McKenna's
famous "harbor pilot" example in United States v. Starzecpyzel.37 However,
in the case of much of what is called "forensic science," no such unambiguous
accuracy feedback exists in normal practice. Unlike the harbor pilot, who
either arrives at the right dock or does not, and knows it, a person making a
forensic bite mark identification, for example, usually only knows ff his
conclusion was right or wrong by whether or not a jury agrees with him. In
such cases, reliance on the fact that the witness had experience alone as an
index of reliability would be irrational. Application of the "astrology test,"
the litmus test for unacceptable tests of reliability, easily demonstrates this.
The court in Kumho Tire explicitly recognizes that astrology is a disci-
pline that "lacks reliability"I and that application of a test in a way that
resulted in the admission of testimony by such a discipline would be error,
using both astrology and necromancy as examples.39 However, astrologers
might pass a simple experience test. They may have dealt with thousands
of horoscopes and thousands of cases involving the astrological implica-
tions of a particular star chart to honesty. It is not their experience that we
doubt, but their methods of conclusion. So, in circumstances when experience
alone does not resolve the main doubts about reliability, it would be irrational,
and therefore an abuse of discretion to rely upon it. This sort of result was
clearly on Justice Scalia's mind when he states in concurrence (joined by
Justices O'Connor and Thomas) that he takes the Court's opinion to be clear
that:
IThe discretion [the Court] endorses - trial court discretion in choosing
the manner of testing expert reliability - is not discretion to abandon the
36. See id. § 34-2.3, at 8-10 (discussing witnesses whose role goes beyond mere summari-
zation).
37. See United States v. Starzeepyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (1995) (analogizing
handwriting expert to harbor pilot who learns by experience). The problems with the harbor
pilot analogy are discussed in D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience
in the Courts: DaubertMeets HandwritingIdentfication Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 33-34
(1996), and in Risinger, supra note 13, § 34-2.4, at 14.
38. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
39. Id.
NON-SCIENCE FORENSIC SCIENCE AFTER KUMHO TIRE 777
gatekeeping function. I think it is worth adding that it is not discretion to
perfomthefunctioninadequately. Rather, itis discretionto choose among
reasonable means of excluding expertise that isfausse and science that is
junky. Though, as the Court makes clear today, the Daubertfactors are not
holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of them
may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.'
If the sufficient experience test is inadequate in most applications, the
guild test is worse because there is no form of expertise for which it is, by
itself, an adequate proxy for reliability analysis. Even though it may be that
the failure of a particular expert to adhere to the minimum practice standards
of a group with which he associates himself might rationally bear on the
unreliability of his testimony,41 adherence to such standards cannot establish
reliability when, as is often the case, it is the very reliability of the standard
practice that is in issue. The guild test does at least claim to deal with reliabil-
ity of the process beyond individual experience, but the reliability judgment
is delegated to a group that, by definition, already believes in the process. The
guild test trades the ipse dixit ofthe individual for the ipse dixit of the group.
42
As such, it flunks the astrology test even more dramatically than the experi-
ence test because judgments concerning what constitutes sufficiency of
experience also are largely abandoned to the guild. There may already be
astrology groups in place that could pass any version of the guild approach
that did not look at independent evidence of reliability, and there certainly are
40. Id. at 158-59 (Seali, ., concurring).
41. I take this to be the point of various references to such circumstances in the Kumho
Tire opinion. Carlson, the expert in that case, claimed to be a member of a subset of the
community of engineers which dealt with the examination of failed tires to determine causes of
failure, and as the court was at pains to point out, nobody in the case denied that "tire abuse may
often be identified by qualified experts through visual and tactile inspection of the tire." Id. at
156. The specific issue concerned whether this was one of those times, and the fact that Carlson
appeared to be unique, or at least rare, in claiming that the non-existence of tire abuse could be
established by the methodology he employed was clearly relevant to assessing the reliability of
that methodology. Hence, the references to whether an expert's "preparation is of a kind that
others in the field would recognize as acceptable," id. at 151, that the objective in this case was
"to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field," id. at 152, that no other "experts in the industry use
Carlson's two factor test," id. at 157, and no one "[refers] to any articles or papers that validate
Carlson's approach." Id. These references show that in the particular circumstances of a case
like Kumho Tire, deviations from practice standards of a group with which the witness identifies
are relevant. They do not establish the acceptability of a guild test when the reliability of the
group practice itself is what is being challenged.
42. See id. at 157 ("Nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit
of the expert." (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,146 (1997))).
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such groups of graphologists. 3 As already noted, the majority in Kumho Tire
recognizes the inadequacy of such "general acceptance" by a community when
it is the reliability of the discipline itself, at least in its particular application
to the case at hand, that is the issue.
ff. Applying the Lessons of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael to
pre-Kumho Tire Cases
Wilh these points in mind, we turnto the issues of handwriting identifica-
tion reliability, as dealt with in the post-Daubert/pre-Kumho Tire cases and in
subsequent cases. Hopefully the reader will recognize that points made in
regard to the handwriting have general application to more than merely
handwriting. Other topics with applications of controversial reliability
include bitemark identification,' toolmark identification,45 arson investiga-
tion, and even some aspects of fingerprint identification, firearms identifica-
tion and forensic pathology. However, I have chosen handwriting identifica-
tion to illustrate the general problems ofthe approach of courts to prosecution
proffered non-science forensic science for two reasons: first, because it is the
area I know best and, more importantly, because it is the area of non-science
forensic science that has had the greatest amount of action in the courts in the
post-Daubert period.
Not that this has been a lot. Since the date of the Daubert decision,
more than 300 reported cases have noted the presence of questioned docu-
ment examiner evidence. Nearly 90% of these cases have involved handwrit-
ing identification.' Yet so far as can be determined from the opinions, liti-
43. "Graphology" involves the claimed ability to infer personality characteristics from
handwriting. It is generally inadmissible in court, but is used by some employers for employee
screening. See generally Julie A. Spoh, Note, The LegalImplications of Graphology, 75 WAs.
U. L.Q. 1307 (1997) (discussing uses of graphology).
44. See 2 FAIcmAN ET AL., supra note 7, at § 24 (surveying field of bitemark identifica-
tion).
45. See id at § 23 (surveying field of firearms and toolmark identification).
46. See id. at § 26 (surveying field of arson investigation and identification).
47. The numbers are rounded because it is somewhat difficult to be absolutely sure of
exact completeness, and because it is the general magnitude that counts for my purposes any-
way. However, anyone interested can examine the cases themselves by doing the following:
Go to Westlaw, and on to the Allfeds, Allstates, and Military Cases databases, search for "docu-
ment examiner," "handwriting identification," and "handwriting analysis" separately since the
date of Daubert. Go through the cases and subtract those dealing with other aspects of docu-
ment examination, such as typewriter identification. The number given in the text does not
include the substantial number of cases where criminal defendants complain that the prosecution
failed to produce document examiner testimony, or where they attacked their own lawyer for
ineffective assistance of counsel for so failing.
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gants have effectively raised dependability issues in only nine of those cases,
all in federal court.4 In the state courts, where the majority of cases arise
(split about evenly between civil and criminal cases), not a single reported
opinion, with one possible exception,49 reflects a significant reliability chal-
lenge to any aspect of standard document examiner practice." Although in
some cases the non-expert evidence is so strong that mounting an attack on the
reliability of the expertise might arguably be thought a useless waste of
resources, there are other cases, including criminal cases, in which the hand-
writing identification is central yet no challenge has been mounted." (It does
make one wonder what in the sociology of the criminal defense bar accounts
for such a result.)
48. See infra note 52 4nd accompanying text (listing reported cases raising dependability
issues). Two other unreported cases, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL
47724 (D. Colo. Trans. Feb. 5,1997) and United States v. Brown, No. CR 99-184 ABC (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 1, 1999), have also involved reliability challenges. Judge Matsch's decision in
McVeigh, which allowed the document examiner to point out similarities between the ques-
tioned document and the known exemplars, but not to give a conclusion about the authorship
of the questioned document, has been influential even though it was promulgated without
formal opinion. It was also influential in the McVeigh case itself, since the prosecution chose
not to call its document examiner after the court made a ruling limiting his testimony.
McVeigh also illustrates the problem of defining what constitutes a "reported opinion" in
the days of databases. The oral argument that led to Judge Matsch's decision is reported at
1997 WL 47724. The colloquy, though extensive, does not reveal sufficient facts to determine
exactly what task was at issue in the case, beyond the fact that some documents were going to
be attributed to McVeigh by a document examiner after comparing them with known samples
of McVeigh's handwriting. There may have been an issue of printing comparison, or printing
to cursive comparison, but that is not clear. Clearly, Judge Matsch does not formulate the
specific task at hand with the particularity required by Kumho Tire, but his result has been very
influential, as evidenced by its impact on UnitedStates v. Hines and subsequent cases. See infra
notes 125-37 and accompanying text (discussing Hines); infra notes 139-146 and accompanying
text (discussing Santillan).
49. See Basinger v. Commonwealth, No. 2968-98-4,2000 WL 724037 (Va. CL App. June
6, 2000). Basinger was a forgery case in which the defense attorney generally objected to the
reliability of handwriting identification at trial. The objection was overruled by the trial judge
on precedential grounds and disposed of in an equally cursory fashion on appeal.
50. State v. Wilson, No. 69346,1997 WL 127186 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 1997), might
have involved a general challenge to reliability, but the opinion is too cursory and general to
tell. The trial court in Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. 1999), excluded the testimony
of a document examiner in a vote challenge case (invoking Daubert) because the examiner
admitted he had not followed standard procedures in examining the challenged ballot signatures,
but even this exclusion was found to be an abuse of discretion on appeal.
51. See, e.g., State v. Stokes, 853 S.W.2d. 227,239 (Tex. App. 1993) (upholding convic-
tion partially based on unchallenged testimony of forensic document examiner); State v. Wilson,
682 N.E.2d 5, 10 (Ohio CL App. 1996) (upholding conviction based in part on handwriting
evidence).
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Turning now to the reliability challenges reflected in the reported cases,
as noted, there are nine such cases, all federal, generating ten opinions. 2
United States v. StarzecpyzeP3 is the first handwriting expertise reliability
case of the modem era. 4 In that case, Roberta and Eileen Starzecpyzel were
charged with having stolen various works of art from Roberta's elderly (and
now senile) aunt.5" They claimed that the paintings were a gift made prior to
the aunt's impairment." Part of the evidence against them was the proposed
testimony of a questioned document examiner who, after examining numerous
authentic signatures of the aunt on checks and other documents, concluded
that the aunt's signatures on deeds of gift for the artwork were forgeries. 7 He
did not claim to be able to identify either defendant as the forger.
58
Judge MeKenna of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York held an extensive hearing on the state of knowledge concerning the
reliability of such asserted expertise. Judge McKenna's opinion examines the
claims ofhandwriting identification expertise to scientific status at length, and
rejects them.59 Having done this, however, he concludes that because such
52. Theseten opinions are: UnitedStatesv. Paul, 175 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997); UnitedStates v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir.
1995); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (D. Neb. 2000); United States v.
Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); United Statesv. Santillan,No. CR-96-40169 DLJ, 1999 WL 1201765 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 3, 1999); United States v. Battle, No. 98-3246, 1999 WL 596966 (10th Cir. Aug. 6,
1999); United States v. Ruth, 42 MJ. 730 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1995); and a second opinion in
United States v. Ruth, 46 M.. 1 (C.A.A.F. 1997). I treat opinions on the standard legal data-
bases as reported, even if some of them are technically to be treated as "unreported" under the
rules of particular jurisdictions (which is not the case with Santillan). In the spirit of fullest
disclosure, it should be noted that the author consulted in Starzecpyzel; that the author's friend
and colleague Dr. Michael J. Saks was a defense witness in Starzekpyzel, Rutherford, and
Brown; and that the author's friend and colleague Professor Mark P. Denbeaux was a defense
witness or proffered witness in Ruth, Velasque, Paul, and Hines.
53. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
54. United States v. Starzeepyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
55. Id. at'1028. Much of the treatment of Starzecpyzel and Velasquez is drawn from D.
Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in 2 MODERN SCIfNTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note
13, § 22, at 79-123.
56. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1028.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Seeid. at 1036.
Were the Court to apply Daubert to the proffered FDE testimony, it would have to
be excluded. This conclusion derives from a straightforward analysis of the sug-
gested Daubert factors - testability and known error rate, peer review and publica-
tion, and general acceptance - in light of the evidence adduced at the Daubert
hearing.
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experts are not practicing a science within the meaning ofDaubert, Daubert's
validation requirements therefore do not apply.' (This approach obviously
does not survive Kumho Tire.) He then, as already noted, analogizes such a
proffered expert to a harbor pilot who learns how to do something dependably
by experience.61 As to whether the court would allow the prosecution's expert
to testify to his conclusion that the signatures on the documents were forgeries
based on his examination of numerous genuine signatures of the putative
victim, the court says that the defense had:
presentedno evidence, beyondthebald assertions [ofits experts], that FDEs
[forensic document examiners] cannot reliably perform this task. Defen-
dants have simplychallengedthe FDE communityto prove thatthis task can
bedonereliably. Such a demonstration ofproof whichmaybe appropriate
forascientificexpertwitness, has neverbeeniniposed on"skilled" experts.
62
Judge McKenna then declares himself persuaded that the inferences as to
genuineness ofthe signature at issue in the case before him "can be performed
with sufficient reliability to merit admission.1
63
Finally, it should be noted that (in anticipation of Kumho Tire) Judge
McKenna emphasizes that he is dealing only with the limited issue of the skill
of comparing a known signature with a questioned signature to determine
whether the person whose name was reflected actually signed the questioned
signature. Judge McKenna makes clear that his analysis does not apply to any
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1029.
62. Id. at 1046. The implication that the ultimate risk of non-persuasion as to reliability
is ever on the opponent of a proffer of evidence is startling, in light of Rule 104 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the general notion that the party seeking admission must affirmatively
convince the court of admissibility once the matter is seriously put in issue. Actually, Judge
McKenna seems to have been aware of the problems that would be created by formally placing
the burden of persuasion on the opponent of a proffer. The actual position taken by his opinion
on that issue is ambiguous and unclear and, one must conclude, intentionally so. In the only
explicit discussion of the issue, he concedes that Professor Berger takes the standard position
that the burden is on the proponent of admissibility. Id. at 1031. He then cites an unexamined
single line claim to the contrary from the middle of an article by a products liability practitioner
whose main position is that Daubert's effect should be viewed as allowing more things to be
admitted, not less. Id. (citing Maskin, supra note 7, at 1936). However, Judge McKenna
attempts not to choose between these two positions, characterizing the question before him as
"legal" rather than factual, as if that makes the problem go away. Id. His later language from
the passage cited in the text of this article seems to show his functional adoption of the problem-
atical Maskin position; however, as the text indicates, he goes on to say that he is persuaded that
handwriting identification testimony "can be performed" with "sufficient reliability to merit
admission." Id. at 1046.
63. Id. Judge McKenna went on to fashion a jury instruction to be given in advance of
the expert's testimony to explain that the testimony was not the result of a scientific process, so
that the jurors would have no misconceptions in that regard. Id. at 1050-51.
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other asserted skill or global claim of expertise. Later courts and commenta-
tors, who have tended to treat Starzecpyzel as if it dealt with global validity,
have generally missed this point.
In United States v. Ruth,64 the Court of Military Appeals dealt with the
issue of the reliability of forensic handwriting identification,65 The court first
notes that military courts have accepted handwriting expertise "for at least the
past forty-four years."' It then declares that Daubert did not apply to
nonscientific expertise, cites Starzecpyzel to establish the nonscientific nature
of questioned document examination, and declares:
[I]t has been generally understood that expert testimony on handwriting
comparisoncanassistpanelmembersbyfocusingtheirattentiononminute
similarities and dissimilarities between exemplars that panel members
might otherwise miss whentheir performtheir ownvisual comparison....
It is largely in the location of these similarities and differences that a
professional documents examinerhas an advantage overpanelmeinbers.6
As authority for this proposition, the court points only to an unpublished
opinion68 and concludes that the challenged handwriting identification testi-
mony is admissible as helpful to the trier of fact under Rule 702. This
unanalyzed global approach is now clearly unavailable after Kumho Tire.
It is important to note what application of expertise was being claimed
reliable in Ruth. It was not the ability to determine if a signature was genuine,
as was the case in Starzecpyzel. It was the much more questionable ability to
attribute the authorship of a very small sample of writing (like a forged
signature) to a particular person based on comparison to examples of the
asserted forger's true writing.69
64. 42 M.J. 730 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1995).
65. United States v. Ruth, 42 W. 730, 731 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1995).
66. Id. at 732.
67. Id. at 733.
68. See id. (citing United States v. Buck, No. 84 Cr. 220-CSH, 1987 WL 19300
(S-D.N.Y. Oct. 28,1997)).
69. Standard Osbornian theory of handwriting identification holds the latter a much easier
task than the former. See Risinger & Saks, supra note 37, at 73 (discussing theories of hand-
writing identification). In this regard, consider the following quotations from three of the most
respected authorities in the standard document examiner literature:
It is much easier to show that a fraudulent signature is not genuine than it is to show
that such a writing is actually the work of a particular writer.... It would be
strange indeed if in the few letters of a forged signature a forger would incorporate
a sufficient number of the characteristics of his own writing actually to identify him.
ALBERT S. OsBoRN, QuVEsnoNED DocuMENTs 18 (2d ed. 1929).
There are two requirements which must be satisfied before a positive identification
can be made. First of all, the forged signature must have been written in the natural
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The Ruth case involved a get-rich-quick scam that worked like this:
Someone opened a bank account in Lichtenstein in the fictitious name "Wil-
liam Cooper" using a falsified copy ofa passport. 7 The imposter then gained
access to the personnel and pay records of approximately thirty-five American
soldiers stationed at a base in Bamberg, Germany.71 Using the information on
bank accounts in those records, the impostor sent letters to the (American)
banks of the soldiers directing wire transfers of the complete balance of their
accounts to the 'Villiam Cooper" account at "one a.m. Eastern Time Zone on
01 May 1992.72 Apparently, the letters were typed, with handwritten signa-
tures. The scheme was uncovered when the depositors told their banks that
the letters were fraudulent. 3 It is not completely clear whether the depositors
notified their banks before or after transfers occurred, but it appears to have
been before, as a result of bank inquiries concerning these unusual balance
transfer directives.
Suspicion fell upon Private Joseph M. Durocher and Specialist Jeffley
A. Ruth, who were personnel action clerks in Bamberg with access to the
relevant bank information? 4 Authorities interrogated Durocher, who appar-
ently cooperated with prosecutors, confessed to the scheme, and implicated
Ruth. Durocher's testimony was the main evidence against Ruth. The only
corroboration of Durocher's story was a questioned document examiner's
testimony that Ruth signed one of the forged signatures on letters to banks and
that Ruth wrote one (but not all) of the signatures of William Cooper on the
applications used to open the bank account in Lichtensteim 5
handwriting of the forger. Signatures for the most part are short, and even a moder-
ate degree of disguise may prevent accurate identification of a single specimen....
[If the questioned document is not in the natural hand of the forger] the likelihood
of identification is very remote .... The entire problem is an extremely difficult
one, and if not handled carefully, can lead to serious errors.
Ordway Hilton, Can the ForgerBeIdentlifedfrom His Handwriting?, 43 J. CRM L., CRIMMIOL-
oGY & PoucE ScL 547, 548,555 (1953).
[While it is often possible to express and justify a definite opinion as to whether
a signature is genuine or forged, it is rarely that the identity of the forger can be
established by comparing the handwriting of the forgery with specimens of the
handwriting of suspects.






74. United States v. Ruth, 46 MJ. 1, 2 (CA.A.F. 1997).
75. Id.
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By now the reader will see the problem. In Ruth, the writing sample
consisted of only fourteen to sixteen letters, which might or might not have
represented an attempt to simulate the writing of the named signatory. Under
a proper Kumho Tire approach, the issue would have been what, if anything,
establishes that the questioned document examiner can reliably identify the
writer of such a sample. However, the Court of Military Appeals in Ruth
neither asks nor answers this question.
United States v. Velasquez"' presents a similarproblem 7 The case deals
with the conviction of Velasquez under 21 U.S.C. § 848, for engaging in a
continual criminal enterprise involving five or more people.78 The only evi-
dence establishing that five people, rather than three, were involved in the
alleged drug scheme was testimony by a government questioned documents
examiner thattwo alleged co-participants ofthe defendant had written, at least
in part, mailing labels used to ship drugs.79 Thus, under a proper Kumho Tire
approach, the issue would be whether and under what conditions questioned
document examiners can reliably attribute authorship of individual parts of a
document, the whole of which is extremely short, to particular individuals.
Again, the Velasquez court neither asks nor answers this question. Instead,
the court once again adopts, without analysis and by default, what functionally
was a guild test. The Velasquez court's "reliability" analysis consists ofinerely
reciting the document examiner's training, experience, and her own assertion
that she had properly performed the analysis. The court declares that this
established sufficient reliability."0 Again, Kumho Tire's emphasis on reliabil-
ity of expertise in regard to the task to which it is applied inthe particular case
would seem to dispose of a guild test as a dispositive approach, especially
when globally applied, as it was in Velasquez.
This brings us to United States v. Jones."1 In many ways, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion in Jones is the standard against which
all other unsatisfactory treatments of reliability issues in any area must be
judged.
76. 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995).
77. United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995).
78. Id. at 845-46.
79. Id. at 846.
80. The Velasquez court initially takes the position that Daubert did not apply to hand-
writing because it was not science. IM. at 850. However, the court then claimed that "in an
exercise of caution" it would review the proffered expertise "for qualifications, reliability, and
fitness as those factors have been explicated in Daubert." Id. It then proceeds to never mention
any reliability criteria beyond the testimony of the document examiner as to the very standard
practice that was the subject of the challenge, and her experience. Id. at 850-51.
81. 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997).
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In Jones, a thief obtained a credit card promotional mailing sent to Kath-
leen Jones's daughter's husband's aunt and uncle, on whose property the
daughter and her husband lived in a house trailer." The thief then rented a
post office box in the name of a third party (who happened to be a co-worker
of the defendant), filled out the credit card application, and requested that the
issuer send the credit card to the post office box.3 When the card arrived, the
thief charged $3748.00 worth of items over atwo week period. 4 The credit
card company's investigation implicated Kathleen Jones. Part ofthe evidence
against Jones85 was testimony by a questioned document examiner.86 The
Court of Appeals's opinion somewhat obscures the exact nature of the docu-
ment examiner's testimony by stating that "Jones's signature was on: (1) the
credit card application; (2) a post-office box registration form for the post-
office box to which the card was sent; and (3) two Howard Johnson's motel
registration forms, which contained the fraudulently procured Visa number at
issue."'I However, Jones's signature was on none of these documents. What
was on the documents was what purported to be the signature of the aunt,
which the questioned document examiner attributed to Jones. So the core
Kumho Tire reliability issue in Jones is virtually the same as the one in Ruth
and close to the one in Velasquez. As in those cases, the reliability issue is
neither asked nor answered. However, the way in which it is not answered is
what raises Jones to new heights of unsatisfactory judgecraft.
The Jones opinion first spends a page disposing of a trivial challenge to
the authentication of an exemplar.' It then spends over five pages discussing
the standard of review to be applied 9 (this was prior to the Supreme Court's
opinion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner) .) It then spends two and a half
82. United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147,1149 (6th Cir. 1997).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. There was not insignificant evidence against Jones independent of the handwriting
identification. In addition to the coincidence that the post office box was in the name of a co-
worker whose purse had been rifled when Jones was around, there was an identification of Jones
by the motel clerk, and an identification of her by her own daughter from a bank camera photo
(at a bank where she had no account) showing her doing a transaction at the approximate time
the credit card was used to obtain money from that bank. Indeed, one significant issue, had the
courts bothered to go into the issues properly, would have been whether the document examiner
was privy to such information and its conscious or unconscious effect on his conclusion. See
Risinger & Saks, supra note 37, at 64 and accompanying notes (noting that handwriting analysis
is influenced by contextual cues).
86. Jones, 107 F3d at 1149.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1149-50.
89. Id. at 1150-56.
90. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997) (setting "abuse of discre-
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pages deciding that Starzecpyzel was right, that handwriting expertise is not
science, and that Daubert is therefore irrelevant?' (this was prior to Kumho
Tire, of course). The court then says "without relying on Daubert, we now
address whether handwriting analysis constitutes 'technical, or other special-
ized knowledge' under the Federal Rules of Evidence and whether the expert
handwriting analysis offered in this case was sufficiently reliable."'  The
court spends less than two and a half pages on these core issues of the case.93
In this sparse treatment, the court initially makes two points it appears to think
are persuasive on issues of general reliability: (1) Other courts and commen-
tators have uniformly found or assumed that handwriting identification
expertise is (globally) a proper subject of court testimony and that the appel-
lant is therefore "asking us to do what no other court we have found has
done,"94 and (2) "the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves suggest that hand-
writing analysis is a field of expertise."95 In trying to justify this latter state-
ment, the court sets out an egregious version of what I call "the Rule 901 (b)(3)
fallacy,"' and flagrantly misquotes the Rule in order to do it.
Rule 901(a) sets out the general standard for authentication of any evi-
dence whatsoever.' Rule 901(b) gives a non-exhaustive list of acceptable
recurrent means of satisfying the general requirements of Rule 901(a) for
"evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims."' One way of doing this is set out in Rule 901(b)(3):
"Comparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which
have been authenticated."" This is the full text of the rule. It is not limited to
documents (much less handwriting), nor does it reference them. In common
practice it has been applied whenever an area ofexpertise, from fingerprints to
DNA analysis, is shown or conceded to be reliable to make such comparisons
under the standards of Rule 702.1' However, Rule 901(b)(3) most certainly
does not contain any suggestion that because there is a claim that an expert is
lion" as proper standard by which to review district court's decisions to admit or exclude expert
scientific evidence).
91. United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147,1156-59 (6th Cir. 1997).
92. Id. at 1159.
93. Id. at 1159-61.
94. Id. at 1159.
95. Id.
96. FED. R. Evm. 901(bX3).
97. FMD. R. EvID. 901(a).
98. FED. R. EVID. 901(b). Presumably, by implication, is what its proponent claims that
renders the evidence relevant, under the standards of Rule 401.
99. FED. R. EvM. 901(bX3).
100. See WPHT& GOlD, FIDRALPRACCE AND PROCEDUREEVIDENCE § 7108 n.2-15
(collecting cases applying Rule 901(bX3)).
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comparing specimens, the existence of Rule 901(b)(3) means that he or she
meets the reliability requirements of Rule 702. This is flagrantly backward
reasoning, whether applied to handwriting identification expertise or anything
else. Pursuant to Daubert and Kumho Tire, the court must determine the
existence of reliable expertise under Rule 702 before it can consider the
evidence at all. Only if reliable expertise exists under the standards of Rule
702 maythe court reference Rule 901(b)(3) to establish sufficiency for authen-
tication purposes (assuming the expertise involves a comparison of standards.)
The mistaken argument from Rule 901(b)(3) just given is the standard
form of the fallacy often put forward in prosecution briefs."' However, the
Jones court takes it one step further (presumably as a result of an embarrass-
ing failure to read the actual text of the rule) when it says that Rule 901(b)(3)
"provides for authentication of a document by [c]omparison by... expert
witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated."1" The court then
compounds its error by claiming that if handwriting identification expertise
were excluded "there would be no place for expert witnesses to compare
writing on one document with that on another in order to authenticate a
document. Inother words, appellant's approach would render Rule 901(b)(3)
meaningless.""1 3 This might be true if the rule said what the court apparently
thinks it says, but plainly, it does not.
To its credit, the court realizes, in instinctive anticipation of Kumho Tire,
that what it has written does not "guarantee the reliability or admissibility of
this type of testimony in a particular case. Because this is non-scientific testi-
mony, its reliability largely depends on the facts of each case."1" 4 However,
it then sets out an approach to "reliability" that barely deals with actual relia-
bility. Perhaps not surprisingly, it adopts a global combination of the experi-
ence test and the guild test.
Jones, as already noted, was not the first court to adopt the guild test.
However, the unintentional humor of the opinion shows forth most strongly
in the details that the Jones court seems to believe help to justify an inference
of reliability. After describing a fairly normal training history for a govem-
ment questioned document examiner, the court notes that his primary job
responsibilities consisted of the "examination and comparison of questioned
handwriting."'' 51 The court then notes that the witness
101. See, e.g., Pre-Trial Transcript at 15-17, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68,
1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo. Feb. 5,1997) (rejecting government's attempt to use argument based
on mistaken reading of Rule 901(bX3)).
102. United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147,1159 (6th Cir. 1997).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 1160.
105. Id.
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estimatedthatthroughout his career, he had conducted "well over amillion
comparative examinations." Inadditionhehaspublishednumerous articles
inthefieldandtestifiedapproximately240timesinvarious courts. Toputit
bluntly, the federal governmentpays himto analyze documents, theprecise
task he was called upon to do in the district court.' °
This may be the only case on record in which a person's government job
description has been taken as evidence of the reliability of asserted expertise.
Even more amusingly, the passage illustrates the credulity ofthe court and the
collision between the court's approach and any mildly skeptical approach to
the dependability of information. This witness testified to conducting "well
over a million comparative examinations."' 7 If he had been doing document
examination eighteen hours a day, every day for fifty years, he still would
have to have done more than three comparative examinations per hour to
reach a million.lra Yet the court accepts the testimony without objection and
cites it as substantiation for the reliability of his expertise. The Jones court
then cites Professor Imwinkeiried for the proposition that the reliability of
non-scientific expert testimony increases with the more experiences an expert
has had and the similarity of those experiences to the expert's testimony.1°9
However, the cited article makes no such sweeping statement at the cited
pages or anywhere else. This is not surprising, because Professor Tmwinkel-
ried does not generally make unsophisticated global statements. Imwinkel-
ried's article does take the position that some kinds of inferences must be
based on much experience as a precondition to any claim to reliability, but it
never says that such experiences alone guarantee, or even necessarily increase,
accuracy in all cases. °
The court-then continues its unaccountable course by asserting that "hand-
writing examiners themselves have recognized the importance of experi-
106. Id. (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 1161. Lest the reader believe that some transcription error has been made, the
trial transcript does indeed reveal this to have been Mr. Sperry's testimony. Transcript of Testi-
mony, at 123, United States v. Jones, No. CR 3-95-24 (ED. Tenn. June 29, 1995) (on file with
author).
108. The real circumstances are even more extreme. Mr. Sperry began his training (a two
year course) in 1979. Transcript of Testimony, at 121, United States v. Jones, No. CR 3-95-24
(E.D. Tenn. June 29, 1995) (on file with author). Thus, at the time of trial, June 1995, he had
16 years of experience, 14 of which were post-training. This more than triples his actual hourly
output, to over nine for every waking hour. Yet, besides his "well over a million comparative
examinations," he also testified to having been assigned to "7300 [or] 7400 cases." Id. at 123.
This works out to at least one and a quarter cases, every day including Sundays and holidays,
without a break, for all 16 years, including his training period.
109. United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1160 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Imwinkelried,
supra note 13, at 2292-93).
110. Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2292-94.
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ence' 'n (no doubt true), but it supports this assertion with a quote from an
article in the Journal of Forensic Document Examination that actually claims
that the bulk of document examiner experience with handwriting forms is
obtained outside the professional sphere and is common with the rest of the
world. "For handwriting examiners, this experience comes mainly from the
exposure we have to handwriting throughout the course of our life, the major-
ity of which normally would occur before specializing in forensic handwriting
examination.0
1 2
It is on these grounds, coupled with the fact that the document examiner
described the process by which he arrived at his conclusions, that the court
declares "given Sperry's various training experiences, his job responsibilities,
his years of practical experience, and the detailed nature of his testimony in
this case, the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting his testimony." 1 3
If the Jones court's careless handling of both sources and reasoning is
unusual, United States v. Paul"4 is in some ways stranger still." 5 InPaul, the
Court of Appeals's statement ofthe facts and history ofthe case is precise and
pertinent, and will be set out here in its entirety.
I. FACTS
In May 1996, an unidentified person who stated that he was a bank
investigator telephoned Ed Spearman, branch manager of Wachovia Na-
tional Bank (Wachovia) atAtlanta, Georgia, andwamed himthat someone
intended to leave a note at thebank in an attempt to extort money from the
bank. The "investigator' instructed Spearmanto followthe directions inthe
note. SpearmancontactedbanksecurityandtheFederalBureauoflnvesti-
gation (FBI), who advised him to contact the agency immediately if he
receivedanextortiondemand. Onthefollowingmoming a securitycamem
outside the entrance to WachoviaBankvideotaped a man, wearing a scarf
and sunglasses, place an envelope under the front door of the bank. Inside
the envelope, addressed to Spearman, was an extortion note that directed
Spearmantodeliver$100,000tothemen'srestroomofadowntownAtlanta
McDonald's restaurant ThenotethreatenedviolenceifSpearman did not
follow the instructions and make the payment Spearman notified bank
security and the FBI.
The investigating agents developed aplanto arrest the extortionist: an
FBI agent, acting as Spearman, would drive Spearman's carto the McDon-
111. Jones, 107F.3dat1160.
112. Id. (quoting Bryan Found & Doug Rogers, Contemporary Issues in Forensic Hand-
writing Examination: A Discussion of Key Issues in the Wake of the Stazepyzel Decision, 8
J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 1, 26 (1995)).
113. Id. at 1161.
114. 175 F.3d 906(11th Cir. 1999).
115. United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1999).
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 767 (2000)
ald's andplace abriefcaseinthe men's restroom, while surveillance agents
would watch the restroom and arrest the person who took the briefcase.
In executing the plan, FBI Agent Eric Bryant testified that upon his
arrival at the McDonald's, he entered the men's restroom, observed appel-
lant Sunonda Paul in a restroom stall, left a briefcase and exited the rest-
room. FBI surveillance agents testified that they later saw Paul sitting at
a table near the restroom. As Bryant left the McDonald's, surveillance
agents observed Paul enterthe restroom again andthen attempt to leavethe
establishment with the briefcase in his backpack When confronted, Paul
told the agents that he was inthe areatovisitanearby gymand had stopped
at the McDonald's for breakfast. He also told themthat he decided to take
the briefcase after he found it in the restroom. Paul, however, was dressed
in casual street clothing and had no gym clothes or athletic equipment in
his possession. The agents arrested him.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A grand jury indicted Paul on one count of bank extortion, inviolation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and Paul pleaded not guilty. Prior to trial, Paul
moved in limine to exclude FBI document examiner Larry Ziegler's testi-
monyregarding handwriting analysis. The district court, however, denied
Paul's motion at the pretrial hearing.
The demand note left at Wachoviawas thekey evidence in determining
whether Paul was the extortionist. Although FBI agents examined the
videotape to determine the identity of the person who delivered the note,
they could not identify the person conclusively. Consequently, the FBI
conducted fingerprint and handwriting analysis tests on the note to estab-
lishthe identity ofthe extortionist. Afngerprint expert concludedthatthe
latent prints on the note and envelope did not match Paul's fingerprints.
Ziegler, the FBI document examiner, comparedthe handwriting onthe
note and the envelope to Paul's handwriting samples and concluded that
Paul was the author of both. Specifically, Ziegler asked Paul to write the
word restaurant Inthepresence ofanFBI agent, Paul misspelledthe word
as follows: "resturant." In the extortion note the extortionist misspelled
the word restaurant the same way. Ziegler also asked Paul to write out
"Spearman." Paul spelledit "Sperman," the same waythe extortionisthad
addressed the envelope. 16
Oddly, the court seems to turn the case into one concerning the depend-
ability of reasoning about the authorship of a document from misspellings in
exemplars, without realizing that this is not necessarily an expertise issue.
Additionally, the practice is somewhat controversial even in document exam-
iner literature, and it has little to do with the reliability of assignment of
authorship based on comparison of form.
116. Id.at908-09.
790
NON-SCIENVCE FORENSIC SCIENCE AFTER KUMHO TIRE 791
Suppose an investigator with no claimed skill in document examination
notices what appears to himto be unusual misspellings in a typed robbery note
(the same misspelling, say, that was in the robbery note in Woody Allen's
movie Take the Money and Run, which said (in part), "I am pointing a gub at
you"). Acting on other information, he obtains a search warrant for the resi-
dence of a suspect and discovers numerous documents, typed or not, in which
the suspect refers to "gubs" in contexts which clearly indicate he meant guns
("the NRA is right to oppose gab control legislation"). Virtually every court
would receive such evidence authenticated by the investigator, though he
claims no special knowledge about the uncommonness of this particular
misspelling of "gun." Such a case raises interesting issues ofjury notice and
the accuracy of jury notice in regard to base rate occurrences of misspellings
derived from common experience, but it does not raise issues of Dauberti
Kumho Tire reliability of expertise. Exactly how much a document examiner
ought to rely on or be influenced by misspellings is a subject of some contro-
versy, and document examiner literature contains warnings against assuming
uncommonness and making too much of misspellings.117 All of this appears
to have escaped the notice of the Court of Appeals, however, because the
opinion never mentions these issues.
Of course, though it is not explicitly noted by the court, the questioned
document examiner in the case did perform a comparison-of-form analysis in
addition to noting the misspellings, and it was that identification by compari-
son of form that was the subject of Paul's reliability objection. The court
deals with that objection as follows:
PaularguesthatZiegler'stestimonyisnotadmissibleundertheDaubert
guidelines because handwriting analysis does not qualify as reliable scien-
tific evidence. His argument is without merit In Daubert, the Supreme
Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 controls decisions regarding
the admissibility of expert testimony. The Supreme Court declared that
under Rule 702, when "[flaced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-
monyL] the trial judge must determine at the outset pursuant to Rule
104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowl-
edge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact
inissue." The Supreme Court statedthat "(tlheinquiry envisionedbyRule
702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one" and that 'Rule 702... assign[s] to
the trial judge the task ofensuringthat an expert's testimonyboth rests on
a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand." The Court also
listed several factors to assist in the determination of whether evidence is
scientifically reliable....
117. See Risinger et al., supra note 3, at 770-71 (cifing warning against mistaken interpre-
tations of misspelings).
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Many circuits were split at the time of trial, however, on whether
Daubert should apply to nonscientific expert testimony. Some held that
the application of Daubert is limited to scientific testimony, while others
used Daubert's guidance to ensure the reliability of all expert testimony
presented at trial.
Recently, however, in Kumho Tire Company, Ltd v. Carmichael, the
Supreme Court heldthatDaubert's "gatekeeping" obligation, requiringthe
trialjudge'sinquiryintoboththe expert's relevance and reliability, applies
not only to testimony based on "scientific" testimony, but to all expert
testimony. The Court further noted that Rules 702 and 703 give all expert
witnesses testimonial leeway unavailable to other witnesses on the pre-
sumptionthat the expert's opinion "will have a reliable basis in the knowl-
edge and experience ofhis discipline." Moreover, the Courtheldthatatrial
judge may consider one or more of the specific Daubert factors when
doing so will help determine that expert's reliability. But, as the Court
stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is a "flexible" one, and Daubert's
list of specific factors neither necessarily nor solely applies to all experts
or in every case. Alternatively, Kumho declares that "the law grants a dis-
trict court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reli-
ability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination. ,8
And that is all, folks. The careful (or even careless) reader will have noted
that, beyond declaring in the second line of the passage that Paul's "argument
is without merit," the court never addresses the reliability issue, nor does it
address what, if anything, was before the district court that would not have
rendered its determination of reliability an abuse of discretion. There is no
formulation of "the task at hand," no description of a reliability test, no
reference to information before the district court or the district court's reason-
ing, nothing.
Having assumed the conclusion of sufficient reliability with no analysis
of the issue whatsoever, the rest of the opinion on admissibility follows as a
matter of course, finding after a recitation of the expert's credentials that the
testimony of a qualified expert could assist the trier of fact and that its prejudi-
cial effect did not substantially outweigh its probative value." All of this is
based on the assumed conclusion to the reliability issue that the court never
explicitly addresses, but given the recitative as to credentials, what emerges
in the end is functionally the guild test.
To complete the Court of Appeals's reliability opinions extant as of this
writing, we turn to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion in United
States v. Battle.12 Battle was accused of coming from New Yorkto Kansas to
118. Paul, 175 F3d at 909-10 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
119. Id. at9ll.
120. No. 98-3246,1999 WL 596966 (10th Cir. Aug. 6,1999).
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set up a drug distribution operation." The evidence against him was volumi-
nous and involved many witnesses and many episodes."z The handwriting
identification testimony figured in a single episode not particularly central to
the case, but nevertheless relevant because, if believed, it would establish that
Battle received money surreptitiously from an out-of-state source under suspi-
cious circumstances. Western Union had a record ofa money transfer showing
a "Tyler Evans" as the sender and "Anthony Jenkins" as the receiver." The
questioned document examiner was called to testify that he had examined
exemplars of Battle's signature given when he was booked and, in his opinion,
Battle signed the name "Anthony Jenkins" to the money transfer.124
As usual, the court fails to realize that the document examiner was testify-
ing to one of the sub-tasks in handwriting comparison most likely to be unreli-
able. There are eleven letters in "Shawn Battle" and fourteen in "Anthony
Jenkins" (which was signed only once). The two names share no capital letters,
no letter combinations, and only four small letters (e, h, n, and t). One sample
is in a presumably normal signature hand. The other is not, unless someone
named "Anthony Jenkins" in reality signed his own name. Ifthe Tenth Circuit
had done what the Supreme Court did in Kumho Tire, it would have examined
the reasons to believe or to doubt the accuracy of such a claimed identification.
Although it does cite Kumho Tire in a pro forma way, it does no such analysis.
It merely recites the document examiner's credentials (the guild test again) and
declares that "[o]ur study of the record on appeal convinces us that McPhail's
proffered testimony met the reliability and relevancy test of Daubert."'1 The
opinion manifests some discomfort about its own conclusion, however, as it
goes onto say "[b]e that as itmay, in any event any error in this regard is, in our
view, harmless error when the evidence is considered as a whole.
1 2 6
If the district court opinion in Starzecpyzel started the judicial struggle
with handwriting identification reliability, the opinion in United States v.
Hines" contrasts sharply with the run of Court of Appeals opinions in taking
the reliability issue seriously." On January 27, 1997, someone robbed the
Broadway National Bank in Chelsea, Massachusetts, by using a demand or
"stick up" note and escaped.' The teller who was robbed, Ms. Jeanne






127. 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
128. United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
129. Id. at 63.
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Dunne, described the perpetrator as a dark skinned black man with a wide
nose and medium build."' Ms. Dunne is white, and the court characterized
the description as "as close to a generic identification of an African American
man as one can imagine."031 Later, Dunne failed to pick Hines out of a mug-
book where his picture appeared and failed to positively identify him from an
eight picture photo spread, though she said Hines "resembled" the robber.
Months later, however, she picked Hines out of a lineup and positively identi-
fied him at trial32
The main corroboration of this eyewitness identification came from an
FBI questioned document examiner who compared the robbery note with ex-
emplars of Hines's handwriting and concluded that Hines had writtenthe note.
A trial on this evidence ended in a hung jury. Before the retrial, Hines moved
to disallow the document examiner's testimony based on lack of sufficient
reason to find it reliable under Daubert."3 The court (Judge Gertner) granted
the motion in part and wrote the published opinion during and after the second
trial that also resulted in a hung jury, in order to explain its ruling and give
guidance to the parties in the event of a third trial.
34
As previously noted in regard to Daubert, Judge Gertner identifies what
she takes to be a "mixed message" in both Daubert and in Kumho Tire, with
the emphasis on reliability pointing in the direction of more rigor in the
evaluation of expertise under Rule 702 and the emphasis on "the uniqueness
of the trial setting, the 'assist the trier' standard and flexibility" doing the
opposite. 3 ' Nevertheless, the court concludes that the main emphasis is on
insuring sufficient reliability and that the Supreme Court "is plainly inviting





Judge Gertner accepts this invitation, with a number of caveats. Based
on the hearings, she seems inclined to bar the questioned document examiner
testimony in its entirety. However, "[tihis handwriting challenge was raised
at the eleventh hour. The hearing was necessarily constrained by the de-
mands of the imminent trial and the schedules of the experts. The court was
unwilling on this record to throw out decades of "generally accepted" testi-
mony.'
3 7
130. Id. at 71.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 64.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 65.
136. Id. at 67.
137. Id. at 67.
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In addition, the "compromise solution" Judge Gertner accepts is "derived
largely from the case law that pre-dated Kumho. 13 1 In other words, Judge
Gertner is not entirely comfortable that she had fully digested and applied the
broader implications of Kumho Tire that might have been inconsistent with
this compromise. At any rate, Judge Gertner proceeds to distinguish between
a questioned document examiner's testimony comparing the robbery note with
the exemplars and identifying similarities and differences, and testimony
concerning the document examiner's inferences of authorship based on those
similarities. In sum, she allows the former and bars the latter, essentially
adopting the similar approach of Judge Matsch in United States v. McVeigh,
139
whom she quotes at length.
140
There is a certain commonsense appeal to this approach. The document
examiner's extensive experience looking at handwriting may have sensitized
the expert to the perception and identification of similarities or differences
that an ordinary person might not notice. At any rate, the document examiner
will be free to spend more time isolating such similarities and differences than
we could expect jurors to do pursuant to their own examinations during dehb-
erations. Viewed this way, document examiners appear to become summari-
zational witnesses, and the notion of "expertise" becomes much less central
to their fimction.
However, there is a serious problem with this, especially if the document
examiner is allowed to recite her credentials, titles, and job descriptions. By
identifying a similarity or difference, the examiner is inevitably perceived as
asserting the significance of those similarities or differences in regard to
assigning authorship, so that juries can easily infer the barred conclusions. In
practice, this is profoundly true, because document examiners who believe
they have identified the author of a writing by comparison will normally only
point out similarities. If differences are called to their attention, they will
dismiss them as not being significant or "real" differences, but merely mani-
festations of "individual variation." Nevertheless, the Solomonic compromise
of Judges Matsch and Gertner is clearly an improvement over surrendering the
gatekeeping function entirely to the guild, as most other courts have done.




139. No. 96-CR-68,1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo. Trans. Feb. 5,1997).
140. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (citing United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1997
WL 47724, at **3-4 (D. Colo. Trans. Feb. 5,1997)). It should be noted that the author's friend
and colleague Mark P. Denbcaux was the defense expert inMcVeigh as well as Hines.
141. No. CR-96-40169 DLi, 1999 WL 1201765 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3,1999).
142. United States v. Santillan, No. CR-96-40169 DLJ, 1999 WL 1201765 (ND. Cal. Dec.
3, 1999).
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In Santillan, the defendant, Rogelio Santillan, was charged with conspir-
acy to distribute false immigration documents.'43 According to the opinion of
the court, the prosecution's document examiner proposed to testify "that she
has identified, using control samples of defendant's handwriting, Santillan's
handwriting on numerous "questioned" docunents."'144 Note that in an opin-
ion referring to Kumho Tire,141 more than seven months after the Supreme
Court's decision in Kumho Tire, this is as much information as we are given
on the task at issue in the case before the court. Clearly, the requirements of
Kumho Tire are not yet dependably appearing on the radar screens of the
lower courts.146 In any event, Judge Jensen then goes on to deal with the
reliability issue globally. After briefly reviewing (and criticizing) 4 7 the extent
research data, the court adopts the HinesMcVeigh approach."
A similar result was reached in United States v. Rutherford.149 In
Rutherford, someone registered at a cattle auction as one "George Hipke," an
actual person of repute.' ° The imposter then purchased an expensive lot of
cattle and paid for them with a check bearing the name signature "George
Hipke." He then removed the cattle. The crime came to light when the real
George Hipke learned of the check from his bank.
Rutherford was a retired banker in the region. An informant indicated
that Rutherford had masterminded the scheme, although the people at the sale
said that Rutherford was not the person who tendered the check. However,
Rutherford was indicted for bank fraud. The proposed expert testimony was
that Rutherford in fact signed a "buyer registration form" in Hipke's name,
that Hipke did not sign the check bearing his name (a fact that was undis-
puted), that there was a high probability that Rutherford did sign it, and that
inscriptions on the bottom of a "load out" sheet from the Columbus Sale




146. The opinions in Paul, Battle, and Hines all were published after Kumho Tire, but suf-
ficiently close in time that their failure to properly digest and apply it is perhaps understandable.
147. Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765, at *3. Judge Jensen seemed especially troubled that
Dr. Moishe Kam, the government's chief researcher on handwriting expertise issues, refused
to share his raw data.
148. Id. at*4.
149. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Neb. 2000).
150. United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190,1191 (0. Neb. 2000). The details
of the case are derived from the court's opinion, supplemented by a 9/21/00 telephone conversa-
tion with Adam Sipple, Esq. of the Clarence E. Mock Law Firm, Rutherford's attorneys.
151. The only handwritten material besides signatures was the inscription "L & C Live-
stock' on the bottom of the load out sheet.
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Once again, although the court cites Kumho Tire, there is no further
attempt to formulate the separate tasks involved in this scenario or to examine
them individually. This is perhaps a bit surprising, given the extensive nature
of the hearing that was undertaken. And once again, the main task at issue is
the attribution of authorship of a forged signature based on the limited amount
of writing in the signature, though in this case there was more than one signa-
ture to work with.
In any event, after criticizing the highly suggestive way in which the
government presented the problem to the expert in obtaining his original
opinion,152 the court (Judge Bataillon) ultimately adopts the Hines/MVeigh
approach, allowing the proffered expert to testify only by pointing out similar-
ities and differences and not allowing any explicit opinions concerning
authorship or probability of authorship."
Finally, for the sake of completeness, we note United States v. Brown,
54
an unreported check forgery case in which, once again, the defendant disputed
the reliability of the governmen's handwriting expert's testimony that the
defendant authored the forged signature. After holding a Daubert/Kumho
hearing, the court (Judge Collins), adopts the Hines/McVeigh approach by
permitting the proffered expert to testify without rendering "an ultimate con-
clusion on who penned the questioned writings."'55
It is interesting to note that in this set of eleven federal cases (including
McVeigh and Brown), only seven of the eleven trial judges involved held full-
scale reliability hearings. 6 Ofthose who held such hearings, six out of seven
manifested substantial reservations about handwriting identification expertise
even on a global level. 5 Contrast this withthe Court of Appeals judges who
152. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
153. Thereafter, Rutherford was tried and acquitted in May of 2000.
154. No. CR 99-184 ABC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1,1999).
155. United States v. Brown, No. CR 99-184 ABC, slip op. at 9 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1,
1999) (on file with author).
156. Ruth, Velasquez, Jones, and Battle were disposed of at trial, either without a hearing
or on voir dire of the government's proposed expert.
157. Judges McKenna, Matsch, Gertner, Jensen, Collins, and Bataillon were those six.
Only Judge Tidwell, the trial judge in Ruth, seemed unconcerned. Apropos of this, considered
the following quotation from Judge McKenna's opinion in Starzecpyzel:
If forensic document examination does rely on an underlying principle, logic dic-
tates that the principle must embody the notion that inter-writer differences, even
when intentionally suppressed, can be distinguished from natural variation. How
FDEs might accomplish this was unclear to the Court before the hearing, and largely
remains so after the hearing.
United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). [As the Postscript
indicates, Judge Gottschall must now be added to the list of judges with reservations, making
it seven out of eight]
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heard these cases, all of whom were institutionally insulated from having to
come to grips with the actual state of knowledge concerning handwriting
identification by cold records and appendices, and all of whom felt comfort-
able brushing off reliability challenges with some version of the guild test.
The inertia of a venerable tradition of admissibility appears to be a powerful
incentive to turn a blind eye to the evidence. In light of Kumho Tire, perhaps
even appellate judges will have to pay attention to the issues raised by these
cases as well as others involving non-science forensic science of questionable
reliability.
Postscript
As this Article was being finalized, a decision was rendered in United
States v. Fujii.158 In this case, Judge Gottschall delivers the first decision in
a handwriting identification case in modem times that entirely excludes
proffered document examiner testimony on reliability grounds. 59 It is also the
first opinion in a handwriting case to manifest a proper Kumho Tire "task at
hand' approach to the reliability question.
In Fujii, it was alleged that defendant Masao Fujii had been involved in
a scheme to obtain the fraudulent entry into the United States of two Chinese
nationals. The Chinese nationals tendered certain hand-printed immigration
forms in connection with their attempted entry at John F. Kennedy airport in
New York in December of 1999. As evidence of Fujii's participation, the
prosecution sought to call an Immigration and Naturalization Service docu-
ment examiner who would testify that she had compared the printing on the
forms with examples of printing by Fujii, and that in her opinion Fujii printed
the fraudulent forms. The defense objected on DaubertlKumho grounds, and
a hearing was held on the issue.
In her opinion, Judge Gottschall notes that in general "[h]andwriting
analysis does not stand up well under the Daubert standards."'" However, as
to general issues of reliability, she concludes that" [tlhis court need not weigh
in on this question,... for whether handwriting analysis per se meets the
Daubert standards, its application to this case poses more significant prob-
lems."'6' This is for two reasons. First, virtually all data on document exam-
iner dependability in identifying the author of handwriting has dealt with
cursive and not printed ritig. 6 2  The single recorded proficiency test
158. No. 00 CR 17 (N.D. Ill, Sept. 25,2000) (slip opinion on file with author).
159. United States v. Fujii, No. 00CR 17, sp op. at 3-4 (ND. 111. Sept 25,2000).
160. Id. at3.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 4.
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involving hand pritngs revealed a 45% error rate on that test.' Second,
and perhaps more importantly, Fujii is a native Japanese who learned to print
in English as a second language in Japan. The defense submitted an affidavit
of Mark Litwicki, Director of Loyola University's English as a Second
Language program, who had substantial experience with teaching English to
Japanese students in the United States and Japan. 65 The essence of his
testimony was that Japanese students learnto print in English only after years
of training in the exact copying of Japanese characters, in which uniformity
is "an important and valued principle. "t166 Because Japanese students "spend
many years attempting to maximize the uniformity of their writing," the
emphasis on uniformity carries over into their English writing. 67 Conse-
quently, Litwicki testified, "it would be very difficult for an individual not
familiar with the English handwriting of Japanese writers to identify the subtle
dissimilarities in the handwriting of individual writers.""e
Considering all this, the court concludes:
Does Ms. Cox [the document examiner] have any expertise which would
allow her to distinguish between unique characteristics of an individual
Japanese handprinterand characteisticsthatmightbe commonto many or
all native Japanese handprinters? In an analysis that depends entirely on
what is simila between writing specimens and what is different, it would
seem to this court essential that an expert have some ability to screen out
characteristics which might appear eccentric to the writer, compared to
native English printers, but which might in fact be characteristic of most
or all native Japanese writers, schooled in English printing in Japan, in
printingEnglish. Thereis no evidenceintherecordthatMs. Coxhassuch
expertise or has even consideredtheproblemMr. Litwicki has pointed out.
Considering the questions about handwriting analysis generallyunder
Daubert, the lack of any evidence that the identification ofhandprintingis
an expertise that meets the Daubert standards and the questions that have
been raised - which the government has not attempted to answer - about
its expert's ability to opine reliably on handprinting identification in
dealing with native Japanese writers taught English printing in Japan, the
court grants the defendant's motion [to exclude]. 69
163. In Fufii, Dr. Michael J. Saks, as one of the witnesses for the defense, testified about
the results of the 1986 Forensic Science Foundation test. The results of this test are reported
in Risinger et al., supra note 3, at 746-47.
164. Fufsi, dip op. at 4.
165. Id.
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Judge Gottschall's opinion is a masterful example of particularized "task at
hand" analysis under the standards of Kumho Tire. It provides a model for
other courts in how to approach the reliability of specific applications of all
forms of non-science forensic science.
